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I. BACKGROUND ON THE CURRENT CHANGES
It is useful to begin by recalling for a moment what the 1993
amendments introduced. The most controversial feature was the initial
disclosure requirement included in Rule 26(a)(1), coupled with the
Rule 26(f) meeting of counsel and the Rule 26(d) moratorium on for-
mal discovery until that meeting had been held and a discovery plan
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discussed.1 In addition, Rule 26(a)(2) was added to require a compre-
hensive report from expert witnesses, and pre-trial disclosures were in-
cluded in Rule 26(a)(3). 2 The Rule 26(e) duty to supplement discovery
responses was strengthened, and a new provision was added as Rule
26(b)(5), requiring provision of particulars regarding materials with-
held on grounds of privilege. 3 Finally, numerical limitations for inter-
rogatories4 and depositions 5 were added, as were stringent restrictions
on improper deposition behavior. 6
All in all, this was a dynamic package, and it was also met with
considerable resistance. The reaction to that resistance, adopted in
1993, was to authorize districts to opt out by local rule from certain
provisions-notably initial disclosure, the required meeting of counsel,
and the new numerical limitations.7 Nobody expected this situation to
remain for the long term. Whether anyone then actually anticipated
the remarkable diversity of discovery regimes that did result in various
districts (diversity fortified in part by activities undertaken pursuant to
the Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA")) is difficult to say. The reality,
however, was that the diversity was sufficient to prompt the Federal
Judicial Center to issue annual reports including charts showing what it
determined were the actual disclosure and discovery practices in each
district.8
The CJRA ended by its own terms in 1997. In 1996, the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules commenced a review of discovery practice
under the rules to assess whether further changes should be made. Al-
though there were no restrictions on the subject matter of those further
changes, the extensive study done by the Committee indicated that only
moderate further changes were in order.9 Many were of a "housekeep-
ing" variety. Many important features of the 1993 package, such as ex-
pert disclosure and strengthened supplementation requirements, are
unchanged.10
1. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 146 F.R.D. 401, 431-44 (1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 33, 146 F.R.D. 401, 462 (1993).
5. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 146 F.R.D. 401, 449 (1993).
6. Id. at 454-55.
7. Id. at 431-37.
8. See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to Anthony H. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 192
F.R.D. 340, 357-58 (2000).
9. Id. at 356-57.
10. See, e.g., Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), 146 F.R.D. 401, 431 (1993).
[Vol. I
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Overall, one can discern four themes in the current package of
amendments: (1) restoring uniformity of discovery practice throughout
the federal system; (2) constraining improper or overly expensive dis-
covery; (3) prompting judicial supervision in cases in which discovery is
causing problems; and (4) confirming the discretion of the presiding
judge to tailor discovery to the needs of the particular case.1' With that
background in mind, I turn to the major changes in the rules wrought
by this set of amendments.
II. UNIFORMITY
Probably the most important change-particularly for the practic-
ing bar-is the removal of most of the opt-out provisions included in
the 1993 amendments.' 2 This takes the form of removing the authori-
zation for deviation by local rule. The authority to tailor discovery by
case-specific order remains, but the Committee Note to Rule 26 em-
phasizes at several points that "standing" orders applicable to all cases,
or to all cases of a certain type, are not authorized any more than local
rules.13 The numerical limitations on depositions and interrogatories,
therefore, now apply nationwide.
The impact of this change in any given district depends on the ex-
tent to which that district had availed itself of the opportunity to opt
out in the first place. In some districts, this impulse carried over even
to provisions for which there was never any express authority to opt out
in the first place, such as the expert disclosure provisions of Rule
26(a)(2). It seems likely that a number of districts will need to review
their current local rules to make adjustments when the transition occurs
on Dec. 1, 2000.
III. INITIAL DISCLOSURE
As eventually adopted in 1993, the initial disclosure requirement
applied only to disputed facts alleged with particularity, but did call for
revelation by the disclosing party of harmful information even absent a
formal discovery request.' 4 That requirement particularly antagonized
a significant segment of the bar.
11. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P., 192 F.R.D. 340 (2000).
12. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), 146 F.R.D. 401, 431 (1993).
13. FED R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 385 (2000).
14. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), 146 F.R.D. 401, 431 (1993).
2006]
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The most salient change in disclosure, therefore, is to its scope,
which henceforward will apply to witnesses or documents the disclosing
party "may use to support its claims or defenses. '15 Given this revision,
the limitation of disclosure to matters pleaded with particularity was
eliminated. 16 There may nonetheless be an incentive for parties to be
specific in their pleadings to obviate arguments that an opponent did
not initially appreciate what it would use to support its case. And the
recently strengthened supplementation provisions of Rule 26(e) should
prompt additional disclosures as the issues and positions of the parties
become clearer during the litigation.
The Committee Note tries to make clear that this is a bilateral
obligation:
The disclosure obligation applies to "claims and defenses," and therefore
requires a party to disclose information it may use to support its denial or
rebuttal of the allegations, claim, or defense of another party. It thereby
bolsters the requirement of Rule 11(b)(4), which authorizes denials "war-
ranted on the evidence," and disclosure should include the identity of any
witness or document that the disclosing party may use to support such
denials. 17
The new scope of initial disclosure ties in directly with the exclu-
sion provisions of Rule 37(c)(1); the thrust is on ensuring that anything
a party may want to use in the proceeding will be promptly revealed to
the other side. 8 As the Committee Note points out, "use" includes not
only submitting material at trial or in support of a motion, but also use
at a pretrial conference or during discovery (such as during a deposi-
tion).19 Accordingly, any time that something pops up that was not
previously disclosed, lawyers may argue that exclusion under Rule
37(c)(1) should apply.
A second change builds on the authority already in the rule al-
lowing stipulations not to engage in initial disclosure. That stipulation
provision means that if both sides agree disclosure would not be worth
the effort, the rule does not require it.2° If one side favors disclosure
and the other opposes it, the amended rule allows a party who contends
that "initial disclosures are not appropriate in the circumstances of the
action" to present that contention to the court by stating the objection
15. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A), 192 F.R.D. 340, 382 (2000).
16. Id.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 386 (2000).
18. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), 192 F.R.D. 340, 382 (2000).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 385 (2000).
20. Id.
[Vol. 1
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in the Rule 26(f) discovery plan.2' As the Committee Note makes
clear, this is not an occasion for indulging in philosophical objections to
the disclosure concept.2 2 The beginning assumption is that disclosure is
warranted for most cases, and the objector needs to explain why this
particular case is one in which it should not be done. Judges presented
with such objections should focus on whether there is such a reason in
their case.
A third change repairs an oversight in the 1993 amendments by
providing for disclosure by parties added later in the suit. Absent an
agreement otherwise, they are to make initial disclosures thirty days
after they are added.23 It is expected, of course, that if the original
parties have stipulated out of initial disclosure or modified it in other
significant ways the added parties will normally be treated the same
way.24
Finally, in keeping with the uniformity theme, Rule 26 itself lists
eight categories of proceedings in which initial disclosure is not re-
quired.2 5 This listing is meant to be administered with some flexibility,
as explained in the Committee Note, but except for these eight catego-
ries there should be no other categories of cases exempted from disclo-
sure by local rule or standing order.26 At the same time, the
Committee Note makes clear that the presiding judge may prescribe
the nature of disclosure in any case-even ordering it when the parties
have stipulated out-and that such a case-specific order is required if a
party objects to disclosure as described above.2 7
IV. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
For more than twenty years there has been debate about whether
to revise the scope provision now contained in Rule 26(b)(1), and the
2000 amendments do so.2 8 There are four changes to that provision: (1)
The scope of attorney-managed discovery is reformulated to include
anything "relevant to the claim or defense of any party." 29 (2) For
21. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), 192 F.R.D. 340, 345 (2000).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 387 (2000).
23. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), 192 F.R.D. 340, 345 (2000).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 387 (2000).
25. Id. at 386.
26. Id. at 386-87.
27. Id. at 385.
28. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 388-89 (2000).
29. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 192 F.R.D. 340, 346 (2000); see also
advisory committee's note, id. at 378.
20061
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good cause, the court may order discovery to the "subject matter" limit
contained in the current rule.30 (3) The last sentence has been rewrit-
ten to say that discovery "calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble evidence" is limited to relevant material. 31 (4) A sentence is added
reminding the bar and the bench that all discovery is subject to the
"proportionality" limitations of Rule 26(b)(2).32
Some predict a substantial increase in the frequency of discovery
disputes. That might be seen as providing more judicial overview of
discovery in contentious cases. In operation, however, these changes
should not have a dramatic effect on the scope of discovery. The Com-
mittee Note acknowledges that "[t]he dividing line between informa-
tion relevant to the claims and defenses and that relevant only to the
subject matter of the action cannot be defined with precision. '33 The
change surely does not erect an automatic barrier to discovery that may
present problems of calibration of the proper scope in specific cases.
Instead, the amendment should involve the court in that calibration,
and the Committee Note also tries to make it clear that it is up to the
assigned judge to do so in light of the circumstances of the case. As
stated by the Committee Note:
A variety of types of information not directly pertinent to the incident in
suit could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action.
For example, other incidents of the same type, or involving the same
product, could be properly discoverable under the revised standard. In-
formation about organizational arrangements or filing systems of a party
could be discoverable if likely to yield or lead to the discovery of admissi-
ble information. Similarly, information that could be used to impeach a
likely witness, although not otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses,
might be properly discoverable. In each instance, the determination
whether such information is discoverable because it is relevant to the
claims or defenses depends on the circumstances of the pending action. 34
Thus, the vast majority of current discovery would not be affected
at all by this change. Yet, as the Committee Note adds, the change
"signals to the court that it has the authority to confine discovery to the
claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties
that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or
defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings. '35 This is
where the power to expand discovery to the "subject matter" limit can
30. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 192 F.R.D. 340, 346 (2000).
31. Id. at 346.
32. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 378 (2000).
33. Id. at 389.
34. Id.
35. Id.
[Vol. 1
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come into play.36 Ordinarily, one would expect the proponent of ex-
panding discovery to articulate a cogent reason for broadening discov-
ery beyond that relevant to the current claims or defenses. At the same
time, as another change to Rule 26(b)(1) reminds the court, the limita-
tions of Rule 26(b)(2) should be kept in mind when the question of
expansion arises.37
V. ONE-DAY DEPOSITIONS
As amended, Rule 30(d)(2) says that "a deposition is limited to
one day of seven hours. '38 This provides a benchmark for all deposi-
tions. The parties can stipulate to extend the time for the deposition.39
The Committee Note observes that the limitation "contemplates that
there will be reasonable breaks during the day for lunch and other rea-
sons, and that the only time to be counted is the time occupied by the
actual deposition. ' 40 The court may order a longer time for the deposi-
tion, and the amended rule also says that the court must allow addi-
tional time "if needed for a fair examination of the deponent. '41 In
evaluating arguments for more time, however, the judge might well
take account of the way in which the moving party made use of the
time allotted under the rule.42
The reality should be that parties will ordinarily handle this prob-
lem sensibly among themselves, so judges will not be called upon to
referee too many disputes. 43 The Committee Note provides sugges-
tions about some possibly recurrent situations prompted by concerns
raised during hearings on the amendment proposals, stating:
Parties considering extending the time for a deposition-and courts asked
to order an extension-might consider a variety of factors. For example,
if the witness needs an interpreter, that may prolong the examination. If
the examination will cover events occurring over a long period of time,
that may justify allowing additional time. In cases in which the witness
will be questioned about numerous or lengthy documents, it is often desir-
able for the interrogating party to send copies of the documents to the
witness sufficiently in advance of the deposition so that the witness can
become familiar with them. Should the witness nevertheless not read the
documents in advance, thereby prolonging the deposition, a court could
36. Id.
37. Id. at 390.
38. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2), 192 F.R.D. 340, 348 (2000).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 395 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2), 192 F.R.D. 340, 348 (2000).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 395-96 (2000).
43. Id.
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consider that a reason for extending the time limit. If the examination
reveals that documents have been requested but not produced, that may
justify further examination once production has occurred. In multi-party
cases, the need for each party to examine the witness may warrant addi-
tional time, although duplicative questioning should be avoided and par-
ties with similar interests should strive to designate one lawyer to question
about areas of common interest. Similarly, should the lawyer for the wit-
ness want to examine the witness, that may require additional time. Fi-
nally, with regard to expert witnesses, there may more often be a need for
additional time-even after the submission of the report required by Rule
26(a)(2)-for full exploration of the theories upon which the witness
relies. 4"
VI. MANDATORY CONFERENCE OF COUNSEL TO PLAN DISCOVERY
The 1993 amendments included changes to Rule 26(f) that directed
that counsel meet and confer before formal discovery began to develop
a discovery plan that would in turn be delivered to the judge before the
Rule 16(b) scheduling order was entered.45 But like other features of
the 1993 package, this one came with an opt-out provision that meant
that many districts exempted lawyers from complying with it.46
Lawyers who practice in districts that adhere to the meeting re-
quirement informed the Committee that it was one of the most produc-
tive features of the 1993 amendments. 47 But there remained concern
about whether a requirement of face-to-face meetings would be appro-
priate in all districts even though that probably would often prove more
productive than interaction by electronic means.48 The resolution was
to remove the opt-out authorization, but to require only a "confer-
ence," with the court authorized to enter an order (but not adopt a
local rule) requiring that the conference be conducted in person. 49 In
addition, a new provision was added authorizing courts that move too
fast to accommodate the conference schedule contemplated by the rule
to provide by local rule that the conference occur within a shorter time
than provided in Rule 26(f) before the Rule 16(b) scheduling confer-
44. Id. at 395.
45. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f), 146 F.R.D. 401, 443-44 (1993).
46. Id. at 443.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note, 192 F.R.D. 340, 392 (2000).
48. See SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENTS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS - CIVIL RULES REGARDING DISCOVERY 1998-99, at 122-24, http://www.us
courts.gov/rules/Summary-CV Comments_1998_1999.pdf.
49. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f), 192 F.R.D. 340, 347 (2000).
[Vol. 1
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ence, and that the report be submitted a shorter time before that meet-
ing with the court, or that it be made orally.50
VII. PROPORTIONALITY AND COST BEARING
In 1983, the "proportionality" provisions now contained in Rule
26(b)(2) were adopted, and the Committee's Reporter then said that
they constituted a "180 degree shift" from the prior attitude toward
over-discovery. Those provisions direct the court to forbid discovery
that is unreasonably cumulative, that the discovering party has already
had ample time to obtain by prior discovery in the action, or that im-
poses a burden outweighing its likely benefit.51
Whether or not this constituted a 180 degree shift in 1983, the ob-
vious purpose of adopting these limitations was to prompt lawyers and
judges to think more carefully about the possibility that some discovery
is unreasonable under the circumstances of the given case even though
within the general scope of discovery. Many have expressed concern
about whether sufficient attention was actually given to these new pro-
visions after they came into effect. In recognition of that concern, Rule
26(b)(1) now reminds lawyers and judges that "[a]ll discovery is subject
to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). ''S2
The question whether this added reminder would suffice to prompt
judicial evaluation of discovery efforts alleged to be problematic also
prompted another proposal-to provide explicitly that courts may con-
dition discovery exceeding the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2) on payment
by the discovering party of all or part of the resulting cost. This tech-
nique could provide a method for the court to ration access to highly
questionable discovery by giving the party seeking the discovery the
choice whether the cost was worth it. Initially, the amendment propos-
als published in 1998 included a proposed amendment providing ex-
plicit authority for such cost bearing orders in Rule 34(b), but after
further consideration the Committee determined that an explicit provi-
sion should more properly be included in Rule 26(b)(2) itself in order
to make this authority explicit with regard to all discovery, and not just
to document production.5 3
At least two possible issues arose in connection with these cost-
bearing proposals. First, there was no question in the Committee's
50. Id.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
52. Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 192 F.R.D. 340, 346 (2000).
53. Proposed Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b), 181 F.R.D. 18, 89 (1998).
20061
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mind that the courts have had this authority all along, so that the
change might be unnecessary. In its draft amendments as published in
1998, the Committee thus emphasized that "[t]his authority was implicit
in the 1983 adoption of Rule 26(b)(2)," and that the main goal of the
proposed amendment was to make the authority explicit. A number of
witnesses during the hearings, and comments submitted by others, ar-
gued that the change was not needed. 54 Some who commented cited
examples of courts using this authority, contending that these proved
that there was no need to remind courts they had this authority because
they were using it sufficiently frequently even without the reminder.55
Indeed, there was concern that limiting the explicit cost-bearing provi-
sion to Rule 34 (as initially proposed in the 1998 published draft
amendments) might incorrectly imply that the authority did not exist
with regard to other methods of discovery, thereby cutting back on the
utility of the proportionality limitations.56
A second concern was related to the first: Those who emphasized
the courts' use of this power under the rules as currently written ex-
pressed worries that changing the rules to make the authority explicit
might cause an undue proliferation of requests for such orders. Better
to leave the authority as it had been, they argued, unstated but implicit.
Ultimately the decision of the Judicial Conference was to leave the
addition of explicit cost-bearing authority out of the current amend-
ment package. But the addition of a sentence to Rule 26(b)(1) re-
minding litigants and courts of the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2) should
help to cure whatever lack of attention there has been to the propor-
tionality limitations in the past. And the existing authority of courts to
permit some such discovery only subject to cost-bearing orders may
therefore be employed with greater frequency than in the past. At the
least, courts should have the Rule 26(b)(2) limitations and the cost-
bearing possibility in mind when confronted with marginal discovery.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A MODEST PACKAGE WHICH STRIVES FOR
BALANCE
The Advisory Committee embarked on a broad-gauged review of
discovery practices and needs four years ago, and initially considered
the possibility of amendments covering a similarly broad array of top-
ics. Ultimately it produced a package of proposed amendments that
54. See SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 48, at 149-68.
55. Id.
56. Id.
298 [Vol. 1
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was quite modest, and one that sought to avoid favoring either plain-
tiffs or defendants overall. This marks the fourth major package of dis-
covery rule amendments in just twenty years. It is impossible to say
whether this set will endure unchanged for a longer period than efforts
of the recent past. But it can be said that the Committee has no present
plans to give immediate consideration to further possible amendments
of the discovery rules except in two discrete areas-problems report-
edly encountered with discovery of electronically stored or computer-
based materials, and difficulties in discovery resulting from broad con-
cepts of privilege waiver. So it may be that the bar can look forward to
a period of practice under the rules as amended in 2000 before they are
changed again.
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